The stakes are high: About $5.5 trillion in global trade passes through strategic sea lanes in the South China Sea each year, including a large portion of Canada's commercial interests, according to Stephen Nagy, a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo.
Canada is also concerned about the potential impact on its semiconductor supply chain, which is deeply tied to Taiwan, where about 90 percent of the world's most advanced semiconductors are manufactured. Nagy said Canada stands as a defender of the “rules-based international order” in the face of China's assertiveness. Tensions in the South China Sea have culminated in recent months, with Philippine and Chinese vessels directly clashing and Chinese personnel firing water cannons, boarding Philippine vessels armed with axes and machetes, and destroying equipment to disrupt Manila's resupply mission to the disputed shoals. A Philippine sailor looks on as the Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal conducts maritime drills with the United States and Australia in the South China Sea, Aug. 7. Photo: Philippine Armed Forces/Distributed via EPA-EFE
The “might makes right” approach
Canada wants to counter China's “Machiavellian force-is-right approach to diplomacy” in the region, Nagy said, but Canadian engagement could also threaten the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
“Southeast Asian countries are trying to bring in partners from outside the region to counterbalance China's size,” Nagy said, adding that the aim was to prevent tensions between the U.S. and China from escalating in a way that would have negative effects on the region.
After all, the ASEAN Charter requires that ASEAN remain the main driver of external partnerships, not the dictates of great power competition.
But Canada's involvement in the South China Sea could make it harder for ASEAN to adopt a unified stance. Analysts say a fragmented bloc ultimately benefits China, as it can more easily pursue its preferred form of bilateral negotiations rather than negotiating with ASEAN as a whole.
With Canada on board, an ASEAN agreement will be harder to achieve, said Azmi Hassan, a Malaysian foreign policy analyst. Notably, Canada has already stepped up its engagement, providing the Philippines with access to its cutting-edge “Dark Vessel Detection System,” a satellite-driven technology designed to track the stealthiest illegal fishing vessels. Naji suggested Ottawa could soon extend this cooperation to other Southeast Asian countries.
But Malaysian foreign policy analyst Azmi Hassan said the presence of non-ASEAN countries made it difficult for ASEAN to “express one voice” on the South China Sea dispute.
“Canada's participation will make it more difficult to reach an ASEAN consensus. In a way, this benefits Beijing because a fragmented ASEAN will make it easier for China to pursue bilateral talks,” said Azmi, a research fellow at the National Professors' Association of Malaysia.
The problem, he explained, is that ASEAN is fundamentally divided, with some countries aligning with the United States, others with China, while a third group “doesn't seem to care much because they're not directly involved in the conflict.”
Chinese and Russian naval vessels during joint exercises in the South China Sea in July. Photo: Xinhua
Azmi questioned whether the South China Sea was the best arena for Canada to flex its military muscle, saying “if maintaining international order is the main reason, then it makes more sense to increase Canada's presence in the Arctic,” pointing to Russia and China's growing influence in the Arctic.
Indeed, a recent U.S. defense report highlighted the threat of deepening Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, as Moscow reopens and modernizes abandoned Soviet-era bases and airfields while China pours money into polar exploration with an eye toward building a “Polar Silk Road.”
Mismatch between ambition and ability
Jeffrey Reeves, a security expert and senior fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, a North American think tank, said Canada fundamentally lacks the capacity to play a stronger role in the South China Sea.
The Canadian navy is thought to have just three warships in the entire Asia-Pacific region, a “tiny force of almost no consequence,” Reeves said, adding that the idea that the Canadian government could influence the balance of power in the region was “absurd.”
Despite its continuing pledge to help Ukraine, Canada falls short of NATO's minimum defense spending targets. This year, the Canadian government is expected to spend just 1.37 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, well below the transatlantic security alliance's 2 percent benchmark. A Canadian Navy frigate (front row) sailed alongside a U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer in the South China Sea last year. Photo: U.S. Navy/Courtesy of Reuters
The shortfall has not gone unnoticed: Last month, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called on Canada to increase its military spending and present a concrete plan for doing so to show the authoritarian regime that Western allies are aligned.
But despite the delays in defense spending, Canada has pledged an additional C$500 million (US$362 million) in military aid to Ukraine this year, on top of the estimated C$4 billion (US$2.9 billion) in arms and ammunition it has already pledged and delivered to Kiev.
In Reeves's view, Canada's engagement in the South China Sea is “purely symbolic” and aimed primarily at “demonstrating to our Western allies and partners that Canada supports their strategic objectives, even if only limited.”
“In this respect, Canada is part of the U.S. 'coalition of the willing' in the Indo-Pacific,” he said.
“Canada's presence gives Washington a degree of legitimacy. It shows that the United States is acting as part of a coalition of nations, rather than just keeping the peace.”
