Ukrainian military operations in Russia's Kursk region began with several days of air strikes in late July, after which Kiev's ground forces rapidly advanced several miles deep into Russian territory on August 6, 2024.
Since then, according to various reports, they have established a base covering up to 1,000 square kilometers, destroyed a large amount of Russian equipment, and inflicted heavy losses on Russian troops.
The Kremlin has rushed troops to the region but has so far been unable to stop the Ukrainian military advance, much less drive them from Russian territory. Now, unconfirmed but credible reports indicate that Putin has appointed Alexei Dyumin to head the so-called “counterterror” response to the Ukrainian invasion. This is significant for several reasons.
First, in terms of personnel, Dyumin is a former bodyguard of Putin, who also served as deputy head of the GRU military intelligence service, deputy minister of defense, and governor of the Tula region south of Moscow until the end of May 2024.
He was then appointed secretary of the State Council, a body that brings together governors from all over Russia and is chaired by the Russian president. The choice of Dyumin, who is clearly outside the traditional military hierarchy, indicates that Putin does not trust the military leaders' ability to carry out their duties.
So how Dyumin handles this crisis could accelerate or end his rise in Russia's political elite – and if he's successful, it could cement his status as a leading candidate to succeed Putin.
Putin's description of the Ukrainian operation as a provocation requiring an “anti-terror” response is also significant, implying that he is still unwilling to admit that he has embroiled Russia in an actual war with its neighbor.
Rather, the current counterterrorism operations being carried out in Russia run parallel to what Putin has called a “special military operation” being carried out in Ukraine.
Both obscure the true scale of the problems Putin now faces: On the one hand, the Russian president must deal with a very costly war in Ukraine, a conflict that has fundamentally changed the world geopolitical situation and left Moscow with few options other than unsavory and difficult-to-manage alliances with China, Iran and North Korea.
Meanwhile, it will further undermine the perception of Putin and his key military leaders as capable of defending Russian national security. Even if they are ultimately able to contain and push back Ukrainian forces, who are currently stationed surprisingly deep inside Russian territory, the very fact that they have been able to get this far for so long is an undeniable failure.
Blame the West
It is also noteworthy that President Putin has strengthened one of his main justifications for the war of aggression in Ukraine: that “it's all the fault of the West.”
The reported claim that “the West is fighting us with Ukraine's hands” is yet another piece of evidence that for Putin, this war is about more than Ukraine's potential membership in NATO or the EU. It's also an important indicator of what to expect from Moscow in the long term regarding possible negotiations with Kiev to end the war.
Under pressure, Russian President Vladimir Putin presided over a meeting of the National Security Council to discuss the situation in the Kursk region. Photo: EPA-EFE / Gavril Grigorov / Sputnik / Kremlin Pool
What Moscow hopes to get out of this is a weakening of Ukraine and the West, and a relative strengthening of its own position, especially in the event of a possible future conflict with NATO.
This is important both domestically for Putin and in terms of his legacy, which is no secret that it is very important to him. Such preferential treatment could also increase Russian influence amid the rise of a China-led alliance against the United States and its allies.
Continuing to frame the conflict as one between Russia and the West would significantly increase the risks for Ukraine's Western allies and could provide Russia with an opportunity to claim that NATO as a whole, or individual NATO member states, have become co-belligerents and thus legitimate targets of Russian escalation.
The UK’s reiteration of its position that weapons supplied to Ukraine, with the exception of long-range Storm Shadow missiles, can be used by Kyiv for operations in the Kursk region will undoubtedly be seen by Moscow as an example of Western powers acting as belligerents against Ukraine.
Russia has made this claim repeatedly over the past two and a half years but has never followed through on its threats to escalate and is unlikely to do so now. On the other hand, escalation would require Putin to acknowledge a state of war, first with Ukraine and then with the West.
On the other hand, it would likely trigger a NATO Article 5 reaction, calling on member states to defend each other collectively, which would inevitably lead to all-out military conflict.
Neither is in Putin's interest, and the latter is certainly not going to get Russia what he hopes to gain from the negotiations, especially if Putin approaches them from a position of strength.
An operation in Ukraine's Kursk region would likely deprive the Russian president of this opportunity and further create favorable conditions for Kiev for future negotiations. For that reason alone, the current Ukrainian offensive merits continued Western support and calls on Putin's bluff.
Stephen Wolf is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
