In a speech in Munich in February, U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris affirmed that Washington’s commitment to its NATO allies is “ironclad.” Now the Democratic presidential nominee, Harris is largely expected to maintain President Joe Biden’s support for Ukraine and close ties with European partners if she succeeds him in the top job. Her Republican rival, Donald Trump, meanwhile, declared in February that Russia could do “whatever the hell they wanted” to NATO members that do not spend enough on defense, reminding Europeans that he values neither NATO nor U.S. alliances.
After November’s election, one of two very different views of the United States’ obligations in Europe will hold sway in Washington. Across the Atlantic, Europeans are frantically considering the implications of each outcome, hoping to find a magic formula for success with either.
But preparing for specific contingencies depending on who wins the election is the wrong approach. Europeans must come up with a collective plan to engage the United States after this year. If they don’t present a united front, they are likely to compete for the role of the United States’ best friend or push forward individual initiatives to keep the United States engaged in Europe, even if those efforts come at the expense of other European countries.
Regardless of who is in the White House in January 2025, Europe needs a strategy that considers recent transformations in global politics, in the United States, and in the transatlantic relationship itself. The rest of the world’s appetite for the United States to take on global responsibilities is diminishing, and a chaotic multipolarity is on the rise. Americans, meanwhile, increasingly favor retrenchment and protectionism, and U.S. politicians appear more concerned with China than with Russia.
The prospect of a second Trump term has heightened concerns that have been growing in Europe since 2016, when the twin shocks of Brexit and the election of Trump planted doubts about the strength of the European project and the reliability of its main ally. Over the past few years, the European Union has taken some steps to respond to this uncertainty, building policy frameworks for its relationship with China and its objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, bolstering its economic and cyber security, and assessing its strategic and defense environment.
It is high time that the EU similarly reassess its relationship with the United States. No matter what happens in November, Europe will need to define its collective interests in the transatlantic partnership, deciding what it wants to protect and what it expects from the United States. With a strategy designed around a few key priorities—including working with the United States to deter Russia and stabilize the Middle East, defending European prosperity and freedom of action amid the U.S.-Chinese rivalry, and engaging with Washington to address global challenges—Europe can project a strong, coherent, and unified voice on matters involving the United States. Agreeing on a set of interests to promote and defend, including on how best to share responsibilities with the United States, is the only way Europeans can avoid playing one EU country against the other and navigate the uncertainties of American politics.
ROUGH WATERS AHEAD
A second Trump administration would be an especially disruptive outcome for the transatlantic relationship. Trump does not believe that the United States and Europe share core security interests. Instead, he believes that Europe is exploiting the United States to subsidize its security, a view that makes him unlikely to sustain the Biden administration’s strong support for the defense of Ukraine. Trump has repeatedly said that he will try to strike a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war Putin launched in Ukraine “within 24 hours,” most likely sacrificing Ukraine’s security interests and territorial integrity to do so. Trump’s running mate, the Ohio Senator JD Vance, has repeatedly argued against sending additional U.S. aid to Ukraine and advocated for turning U.S. resources and attention to East Asia. European leaders are thus concerned that Trump’s possible return would irreparably compromise U.S. engagement in Europe and invite further destabilizing action by Russia beyond Ukraine.
But this is not just about Trump. Enthusiasm for supporting the Ukrainian war effort is waning in Washington, and declining U.S. weapons stockpiles led Congress to stall deliveries to Ukraine earlier this year, which resulted in battlefield losses. There is public pressure to break the U.S. habit of fighting endless wars, which has already led to a chaotic and poorly coordinated withdrawal from Afghanistan and could lead to a similarly rushed decision to cut support to Ukraine. According to a Pew Research Center poll conducted in July, 50 percent of Americans are “very concerned” or “extremely concerned” that the war in Ukraine could last several more years, and 42 percent think that it could lead to a U.S. war with Russia. Even if Harris is elected in November, additional aid to Ukraine will still require approval in the Senate, where a likely Republican majority will face pressure to deny such aid from the party’s “America first” wing.
Although the Biden administration’s rock-solid commitment to NATO has played a vital role in rallying Europeans to take action against Russia and fostered transatlantic unity, Washington’s top priority remains China. The Biden administration has maintained a rough balance between senior officials working on Europe and those focused on Asia, but the size of the latter group has increased compared with previous administrations. U.S. policymakers increasingly view trade, technology, and alliances through the prism of competition with China. Moreover, Biden’s policies suggest that the goal of outcompeting Beijing takes precedence in Washington over transatlantic and transpacific economic relations or abiding by World Trade Organization rules. The current administration has actually hardened Trump’s approach to China through landmark industrial and export control policies, including the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. This legislation offers major investment advantages to green technology companies that manufacture their products in the United States, encouraging European manufacturers to relocate their factories and undermining Europe’s efforts to expand its own green industries.
UNITY MATTERS
As European capitals brace for November, the tension is palpable. Countries such as the Czech Republic are buying U.S. weapons systems and signing bilateral security deals with the United States as insurance against the possibility of a disinterested Washington redirecting its resources to Asia. Although other countries such as Lithuania have only a limited presence in the Indo-Pacific, they have nonetheless drafted regional strategies to show Washington that they will help contain China—and in the hope that the United States, in turn, will not dismiss their security concerns about Russia. Some German commentators have argued in favor of lowering EU restrictions for U.S. companies to invest in Europe, tightening the United States’ ties to the continent, because they think this kind of transactional arrangement may appeal to a potential Trump administration.
European diplomats are flocking to Washington to talk with staff at the Heritage Foundation, the think tank that claims to be doing the ideological groundwork and talent scouting for a new Trump term. Their main message is to reassure potential future policymakers who are skeptical of the value of the United States’ European alliances; NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, for example, gave a speech in January stressing that other NATO members together have provided more aid to Ukraine than Washington has. But these representatives also want to find out what could and could not be negotiated with a potential second Trump administration. They want to know what could keep the United States engaged in Europe and at what cost. What they fail to appreciate, however, is that a transactional approach can only ever make temporary gains. Durable cooperation requires a shared understanding of strategic interests. And if individual European countries seek bilateral relationships with Washington, the United States will always have the upper hand.
The temptation to bypass Brussels and pursue bilateral ties will remain as long as Europe lacks a clear, unified assessment of its core interests in relations with its key partner. If European countries work together rather than individually, Washington will have to take them seriously and recognize the benefits of partnership with Europe as a collective. New initiatives under the Biden administration have created room for discussion, but they must now be expanded and strengthened. The EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, a forum for discussing technology challenges and coordinating approaches on global trade, proved helpful in supporting transatlantic sanctions on Russia, while U.S.-EU summits provided opportunities to take stronger, more unified stands toward both Russia and China.
If it is to make better use of these forums, however, Europe needs to reach a consensus on a United States strategy. This will give European interlocutors a clearer and more forceful voice in their dealings with Washington and, ultimately, will make Europe a more reliable partner for the United States. By negotiating this strategy at the EU level, European policymakers will ensure that it will be supported with regulation and concrete action through EU institutions. The strategy will also give individual countries a frame of reference as they navigate their individual relationships with the United States. Poland, the next country to rotate into the six-month EU presidency, at the start of 2025, can begin this process. Even if a formal strategy binds only EU member states, the conversation should include the United Kingdom and other non-EU countries, such as Ukraine and Moldova, that play an important part in European security and prosperity.
SPOTLIGHT ON SECURITY
As European countries begin to discuss an EU-wide United States strategy, a clear set of aims should guide their thinking. The first and most important is preventing Russia from winning its war in Ukraine and deterring it from further aggression. Europe’s security is contingent on the accomplishment of both goals, and it must prioritize these interests in its dealings with Washington. No matter the outcome of the American elections in November, European countries will continue providing financial and military aid to Ukraine—and they should make clear to the United States that they expect it to do the same. If the right conditions for a diplomatic solution to the war emerge, Europe must seek assurances that Washington will not ignore Europe’s security interests—which include supporting Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Both Ukraine and Europe, represented either by the EU or by a select group of European countries, must be at the negotiating table.
To demonstrate their commitment to their American ally, European countries must take steps now to support the long-term defense and economic recovery of Ukraine and help it progress toward EU membership. They must also remind Washington that the strength of the Atlantic alliance has kept the peace in Europe and helped stabilize the international order for decades—and warn that failing to quell Russian revanchism in Ukraine and deter further aggression would undermine those gains and embolden U.S. rivals across the world.
European countries must also reinforce the European pillar of NATO by stepping up and shouldering more of the burden. Doing so will better equip the alliance to weather political changes in the United States, as well as strengthen Europe’s voice vis-à-vis its senior American partner. Now that two more EU countries, Finland and Sweden, have joined the alliance, the overlap between EU defense and NATO defense is greater than ever before. The EU should use this opportunity to increase its cooperation with NATO, and EU member states should make sure their own defense projects are compatible with NATO standards and planning. Whether or not the United States disengages from NATO under a new administration, Europeans need to expand their role in the alliance’s logistics and command chains, as well as simplify and standardize procedures to move military personnel and equipment across borders. They can begin this process by arranging staff exchanges between the EU and NATO and by improving information sharing across the two institutions.
European countries must make targeted defense investments to fill gaps in their capabilities, which will reduce their dependence on the United States—for example, in drones, air and missile defense systems, air-to-air refueling, and any other areas in which European militaries rely on U.S. capabilities. EU member states can engage with other NATO allies and partners, including the United Kingdom and Canada, to develop this capacity. And within EU institutions, the next EU commissioner whose purview includes the defense industry could identify the regulatory changes necessary to make this expansion possible. European leaders should also make the case to their American counterparts that supporting Europe’s defense industry is in the United States’ long-term interest. A Europe that can provide security on the continent and beyond is a geopolitical advantage for the United States.
THE LANGUAGE OF POWER
Europe should also stay engaged with the United States on China. A joint transatlantic effort should address China’s predatory trade practices and regional aggression, as well as prevent Beijing from escaping its responsibilities vis-à-vis global challenges. European countries play a role in the stability and security of the Indo-Pacific region, from pursuing economic, environmental, and infrastructure cooperation with Asian partners to joining freedom of navigation exercises and promoting multilateral collaboration on climate issues and ocean governance. In many of these areas, European and U.S. priorities overlap. But the EU must be free to determine its own approach to China, including decisions about how to protect strategic sectors, such as green technologies, and when to seek cooperation with Beijing. Although transatlantic coordination is essential, Europeans may not align on every point with the United States, and Washington should not treat Europe’s China strategy as a test of loyalty. Europe can also serve as a bridge for dialogue and academic exchange amid U.S.-Chinese hostility, keeping channels open with both U.S. and Chinese experts and civil society, as well as with those countries who worry about having to make a choice between the United States and China. To avoid transatlantic discord on this issue, Europe should request that the United States keep its efforts to contain and outcompete China separate from its trade and security policy toward Europe.
Cooperation with the United States on Middle East policy must also feature in Europe’s strategy. Europe has too many economic and security interests at stake in the region to rely on Washington alone to address issues that arise there. And if the EU stands by instead of standing up for human rights and the rule of law, that will damage the international credibility it has built as a promoter of these values. In the short run, the EU and the United States should increase their diplomatic efforts to bring the war in Gaza to an end and prevent a regional war. Europe and Washington should jointly push to restore a political process for a just and sustainable peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. And in the longer term, Europe should stop outsourcing Middle East policy to the United States. It should take a more proactive role in de-escalating tensions created by Chinese, Iranian, and Russian meddling in the region, as well as cooperate with Washington and regional partners on counterextremism and nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
On the economic front, Europe must ensure that U.S. competitiveness does not come at the expense of European prosperity. European governments and institutions should seek mutually beneficial partnerships with U.S. companies and work with Washington to foster inclusive growth in the West and beyond, enhancing economic security and avoiding global fragmentation. But Europe should not enter into an explicitly transactional relationship that trades the continent’s security for economic advantages. If the United States imposes universal tariffs, secondary export controls, or unfair competition practices, Europe should use the trade tools at its disposal to secure its interests. The EU must also assess its vulnerabilities with respect to the United States and take action to protect strategic sectors and create a healthy ecosystem for European tech champions. This may include placing export controls on specific technologies and providing significant funding for research and innovation to attract foreign investment. If U.S. policies put economic pressure on any individual European state, the rest of the EU must be prepared to issue a collective response.
A unified strategy toward the United States will give European interlocutors a clearer and more forceful voice in their dealings with Washington.
No matter how the next U.S. administration approaches the transatlantic relationship, Europe should continue to seek U.S. support and engagement to tackle global challenges. One key issue with which Europe will need Washington’s help is in reforming the international financial architecture, including the IMF and the World Bank, to better equip these bodies to mitigate the adverse effects of industrial competition and provide affordable financing to low-income countries to support their green transition and strengthen their resilience to climate change.
Pursuing sustainable development and meeting climate goals are high priorities for Europe. In dealings with Washington, European countries must emphasize that they expect the United States to be an unwavering partner in building a net-zero world, by cooperating on and financing a green industrial transition. Europe should work with U.S. state governments and the private sector to enforce high climate standards, building channels of cooperation that would remain open even if a Trump administration were to deprioritize climate action at the federal level.
The rules-based order will be stronger, and the world will be safer and more prosperous, if European countries can resist bilateral and transactional relationships with the United States and instead engage with Washington as a unified bloc. European countries may struggle to balance and reconcile their individual and collective interests as the transatlantic relationship changes. But they must succeed so that Europe can anticipate challenges and take independent, constructive action rather than be forced to play defense or to improvise. As Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, said on taking office in 2019, it is high time that Europe “learn to speak the language of power,” including when dealing with its most valuable and important ally. Regardless of who occupies the Oval Office next year, a clearly articulated definition of Europe’s interests and expectations of the United States will contribute to a healthier relationship for both sides.
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