A bipartisan delegation of Japanese lawmakers visited Taiwan last week, the latest in several such visits by Japanese lawmakers over the past few years. To the constant irritation of China, such visits only mean so much.
Visits to Taiwan by Japanese politicians, including future prime ministerial candidate Shigeru Ishiba, signal Japan's concern about the Chinese threat to Taiwan and demonstrate broad support for a free Taiwan.
This latest visit came despite the inevitable criticism from China that followed, with the Chinese embassy in Tokyo, as always, promising that Japan would “pay a heavy price” if it caused trouble in Taiwan.
There is always the possibility that the Chinese government may launch new harassment measures against Japanese companies doing business in China, or take more Japanese people living and working in China as “hostages.”
Another ever-present risk is increased aggression by the Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia around Japan's Senkaku Islands and other Japanese maritime territories.
Therefore, going ahead with such a visit despite the risks shows a certain commitment from Japan to Taiwan, even if there is sometimes an element of kabuki, with some politicians accompanying them (as in this visit) to bolster the credibility of their own weak foreign policy and counter rumors of over-dependence on China.
But that raises the question of what exactly has the Japanese government actually done, overtly (or covertly) to help with Taiwan's defense? The answer is little to nothing.
Japan's Self-Defense Forces have effectively no relationship with the Taiwanese military. Tokyo does not even send an active-duty general as a defense attaché or liaison officer, relying instead on a handful of retired SDF generals whose usefulness is unclear.
The Japan Coast Guard recently conducted basic training with Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels, but this is not significant in terms of necessity or feasibility.
Given the Philippines’ strategic location just south of Taiwan, Japan’s notable contributions to strengthening the country’s defense through the provision of patrol vessels, aircraft, and radar systems as well as deepening defense exchanges may, at best, be indirectly supporting Taiwan’s defense as well.
But in terms of direct Japanese support for Taiwan, beyond these visits and statements in support of the status quo and opposition to the use of violence to resolve the Taiwan Strait issue, there is not much worth mentioning.
This is despite frequent acknowledgments of Taiwan's importance to Japan: For decades, some Japanese government officials and many military officers have said that “the defense of Taiwan is the defense of Japan.”
That's true. Look at a map and you can easily see that Taiwan sits astride the northernmost sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea, through which the vast majority of Japan's trade and energy imports flow. If China took control of Taiwan, it could cut off this vital lifeline to Japan.
Moreover, if the People's Liberation Army were to one day occupy and operate on Taiwan, the Chinese military would be in a position to isolate and even encircle Japan, and it would also be able to expand military operations into the Pacific much more easily than it is now.
And Japan likely knows that a loss of Taiwan to China would undermine the U.S. military presence in the region and the broader basis of American influence on which Japan depends.
Japan understands these risks, and it understands that the Chinese Communist Party is strangling Taiwan and dominating the entire Pacific region, but it has still not done what is needed to support Taiwan.
Don't think that the Taiwanese won't notice, don't think that Beijing won't notice.
Japan may do what is necessary in the future, but it may have to wait until a disaster occurs, by which point it will be too late. So while a visit by Japanese Diet members to Taiwan is useful, it is not as important as one might think.
What should Japan do? Look at what America is doing for Taiwan and do the same. Or look at what Japan is doing for the Philippines and do the same for Taiwan. Anyway, do something. Now.
Grant Newsham is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and former U.S. diplomat. He is the first Marine liaison officer in the Japan Self-Defense Forces and a fellow at the Center for Security Policy and the Yorktown Institute. He is the author of When China Attacks: A Warning to America.
