Indonesia and Australia signed a new defense cooperation treaty on August 20 in what could be a game-changer, depending on details that have yet to be made public.
But with U.S.-China relations constantly tense and Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto set to become Indonesia's president in October, many will likely read the final document carefully for signs of a shift in the strategic positions of the region's two major powers.
Full details of the agreement and its significance will not be known until Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles visits Indonesia next week to formally sign it, but he has already declared victory, hailing the treaty as “the most important agreement our two countries have ever reached”.
Mares noted that the treaty will make it easier for Indonesian and Australian militaries to operate in each other's countries, as well as allowing them to cooperate in support of a “rules-based order,” increase the number of joint exercises and improve interoperability.
“It's not technically an alliance, but it's just a signal to each other that they consider each other's security to be based on the other,” Mares said.
Indonesia, however, appears to be more cautious about the deal's impact. Prabowo hailed the treaty as a major win for both countries, but was careful to stress that the agreement does not undermine Indonesia's traditional neutrality.
“As you know, we are traditionally a non-aligned country. Traditionally, our people do not want us to be involved in any geopolitical or military alliances or groupings,” Prabowo told media at a press conference with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, who framed the agreement as part of Indonesia's desire to be a “good neighbour” to all countries.
“This shouldn't be taken as a sign that Indonesia is in any way less neutral in terms of aligning with the West against China,” said Sam Roggeveen, director of the Lowy Institute's international security program, who has long advocated for stronger Australia-Indonesia security ties.
That has led analysts to caution against taking Australia's enthusiastic rhetoric too literally. “Australia frequently touts its agreements with Indonesia, and I don't think this case is an exception, even if the agreement has treaty status,” said Euan Graham, a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI).
“My sense is that Prabowo does not share Australia's view that bilateral defence cooperation with Australia is about maintaining regional order. Rather, he sees the relationship through the lens of neighbourhood,” Graham said.
Australia and Indonesia have previously signed a major security treaty: the 1995 Suharto-Keating Agreement, crafted by Indonesian President Suharto and Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, committed the two countries to something approaching a defense alliance, but stopped short, in deference to Indonesia's long-standing principle of non-alignment.
But relations have become complicated since then: Australia's intervention in East Timor in 1999 led to the abandonment of the Suharto-Keating Agreement, and the 2006 Lombok Treaty rebuilt ties, setting out a wide-ranging security cooperation programme, but there has also been considerable friction in recent times over AUKUS and the Quad, which Indonesia fears could increase tensions in the region.
Australia appears to see Prabowo's election as an opportunity to strengthen ties with Indonesia, with Mares visiting Jakarta just days after Prabowo's election to congratulate him and begin negotiations.
Prabowo himself has so far been more tolerant of controversial foreign policy decisions, such as Australia joining the Union of Australia or moving the Israeli embassy to Jerusalem, than many other Indonesian policymakers, and his military background and staunch nationalism give him a favorable stance on defense diplomacy.
China's rapid rise has given Australia a strong incentive to strengthen its defense ties with Indonesia. Australian policymakers have often viewed strengthened security ties with Indonesia as an effective counterweight to China's growing influence in Asia, especially among those who question the long-term reliability of the United States as a security partner.
“The big hope of the Australia-Indonesia deal is that they share one important strategic objective,” Roggeveen said, “and that is that neither country wants the waters of Southeast Asia to be dominated by China.” Still, he expects Indonesia to continue to take an independent stance from the West on the issue.
Indeed, Indonesian experts have warned that Prabowo will be wary of anything that could damage ties with China. “Joint patrols in the South China Sea will be something that people will consider very dangerous,” said Yohannes Sulaiman, an associate professor of international relations at Jenderal Ahmad Yani University.
Given its reliance on China for investment in key sectors and Indonesia's limited ability to patrol its vast territorial waters, China's reaction to joint U.S.-Philippine patrols in the South China Sea is a warning that the Indonesian government will likely heed.
Similarly, Prabowo's first foreign visit since being elected was to China, followed by visits to Japan and Malaysia, and Indonesia recently agreed to resume long-suspended joint military exercises with China.
Nor should we underestimate the deep suspicion of Australia's intentions among Indonesia's political elite, many of whom still bitterly remember Australia's intervention in East Timor and recent revelations that Australia had spied on Indonesia's leaders. Whatever Prabowo's opinion of AUKUS, it will continue to anger many in Jakarta's security and foreign policy elite.
Still, the new defense pact is an undeniable win for Indonesia-Australia relations and may signal the beginning of greater integration. Pertamina University lecturer Ian Montratama said Marles' comments about improving interoperability between the Australian and Indonesian militaries are potentially significant.
Under Suharto, Indonesia procured much of its equipment from the United States, strengthening an informal strategic partnership between the two countries.
But post-Suharto, post-Cold War Indonesia has tended to decentralize its weapons procurement by buying systems from the United States and its allies Russia and China alike, resulting in problems that often make it difficult to get these diverse systems to work together.
Improving interoperability with Australia would mean shifting defense procurement focus to Western military suppliers. If this happens, it will not align Indonesia with the West, but it will certainly make it more closely tied and dependent on defense issues.
