Maritime metaphors are unfortunately unavoidable when talking about Australia's never-ending submarine saga, but as investigative journalist Andrew Fowler makes clear in Nuclear Attack: The Submarine Fiasco That Sunk Australian Sovereignty, his excellent and scathing analysis of the origins of the AUKUS Agreement, there's not much else frivolous about it.
Former Labour stalwarts Paul Keating and Gareth Evans have argued that AUKUS is, in Keating's words, “the worst deal ever”, and anyone who doubts the accuracy of this claim should read this book.
Australia's plan to acquire eight domestically built nuclear submarines in partnership with the United States and Britain is expected to cost up to A$368 billion (US$249.4 billion), but it's not just the cost of the AUKUS project that's surprising.
While many will hang their heads in shame, the main architect of this monumental folly is Scott Morrison, whose reputation will naturally be further tarnished by the revelations contained in Fowler's meticulously researched book.
One question the book does not explore in detail is just how abysmal the quality of political leadership is in this country, particularly but not only among the conservative wing of politics.
Whatever the reason, the end result is
The man who brought about a major shift in the direction of Australian foreign policy was a Christian fundamentalist and former tourism marketing manager with no training in strategy or diplomacy but a gift for secrecy and deception.
The change of policy in question was a decision to abandon an agreement to buy much cheaper and arguably much more suitable and deliverable submarines from France, with the aim of “integrating the Australian military into the United States.” In retrospect, it is hard to believe how badly the French were mistaken, or how shortsighted the rationale for the change of policy was.
In Fowler's view, buying the French submarines would have been an “amazing achievement” that would have given Australia “greater independence and a more influential position in the world”.
It would take another book to adequately explain Australian policymakers' fears of strategic and foreign policy independence, but what emerges clearly from Fowler's account is how irresponsible and self-serving Australia's approach to national security became under Morrison, with short-term political gains more important than the endlessly invoked “national interest,” not to mention the fate of the Australian people.
“The fact that a growing US military presence in the Indo-Pacific region could draw Australia into conflict appears to have had little impact on Prime Minister Morrison's desire to strangle Labor on national security issues,” Fowler wrote.
Of course, being seen as “weak” on security, especially the alliance with the United States, was and remains the Australian Labor Party's worst nightmare.
As a result, the Labour leadership has gone to extraordinary lengths to convince voters, and increasingly sceptical party members, not only that they are equally committed to national security, but that the AUKUS agreement is the best way to achieve it.
High costs, high risks
Given that AUKUS was the brainchild of a discredited Conservative premier who Fowler suggests “believed he was on a mission from God”, one might hope that the Albanese government would have been able to carry out at least a perfunctory cost-benefit analysis.
After all, AUKUS is the largest military procurement the country has ever undertaken. Recent defense procurements have become known for huge cost inflation and failure to operate or arrive as advertised.
But Labor has not only fallen into Morrison's trap, it has willingly, even enthusiastically, “accepted a decision that was reached through a deeply flawed process.” More importantly, as Fowler points out, “if the major parties are united on AUKUS, the most complex and expensive expenditure in Australia's military history will never be publicly scrutinized.”
At the very least, this is a stunning failure of good governance and accountability. Perhaps even more stunning, it also demonstrates a remarkable lack of political judgement, driven by short-term political concerns rather than long-term strategic interests.
“Labour has lost its one chance to prove that it is independent and courageous enough to put the interests of the country above its natural desire to win power,” Fowler argues. “The consequences of the horror that forced the Labour leadership to back AUKUS so unceremoniously will haunt them for years to come.”
No surprise there: When there are so few visible differences between the major parties on issues of vital national importance, it is no wonder that voters, especially younger generations, feel despair about the future.
Even setting aside the fragility, unpredictability and polarisation of US politics, it is hardly controversial to say that an alliance with the US has potential weaknesses and significant costs, not the least of which would be participation in wars that have no clear strategic relevance to Australia.
AUKUS would further complicate Australia's relationship with China, its main trading partner, but it also carries other significant risks, and not just because, as Opposition Leader Peter Dutton put it, it would be “inconceivable” for Australia not to fight alongside the United States in any conflict with China over Taiwan.
If the Garden Island naval base just off my house off the coast of Fremantle is not yet a target for nuclear attack, it certainly will be if US and British nuclear submarines begin to operate from there on a regular basis. Whether our neighbours realise they are at risk of being vaporised as part of the alliance and our commitment to the “great nation-building project” is a mystery yet to be solved.
Local politicians, universities and defense officials certainly recognize the short-term benefits to be gained from the new investment. But this means that there is unlikely to be any informed debate, much less opposition, about the AUKUS deal, regardless of what the ultimate cost will be to a country that cannot even provide adequate housing for its own people. Indeed, the lack of debate, or even outrage, about the enormous costs of the AUKUS project is the most striking feature of this sorry submarine saga.
And this was before doubts arose about the reliability, feasibility or strategic relevance of nuclear submarines – people probably finding the technical debate surprisingly boring or incomprehensible.
Perhaps they do not realise that if we spend too much money on submarines, as Keating and Malcolm Turnbull claim, not only will our sovereignty and ability to act independently be seriously undermined, but it will also prevent us from spending money on more immediate and concrete threats, such as repairing our rapidly deteriorating natural environment.
I don't believe Australia needs to buy submarines – this would no doubt be seen as heretical, ignorant and irresponsible by those in the strategic bubble in Canberra – but it is noteworthy that Australia's overall security was not compromised while the ageing Collins class submarines were out of service for four years.
Even widely respected experts on these issues, such as Hugh White, have cast doubt on AUKUS's feasibility. “Long delays and cost overruns are certain,” White wrote. “Total failure is a real possibility.”
Drunken Sailor
Fowler has produced a highly readable book on strategic policy.
His explanation has at times sparked cries of incredulity, particularly about the actions of the Morrison government and its carefully selected panel of like-minded advisers, many of whom are from defence companies likely to benefit from government spending.
Many of Morrison's former ministers, including Morrison himself, have exited through the revolving door between government and business to take up high-paying jobs in the defence industry. Who would have thought that?
Nuked is worth a close read to see how Fowler reaches his reprehensible conclusion.
The Australian government's incompetence was astonishing, and the consequences were far-reaching: the US would have complete control over what submarines to sell to Australia, how old they would be, how many, when they would be delivered, and even whether they would be sold at all.
Washington was expected to act in its own interests. What is surprising is that Morrison could genuinely believe that what is best for the United States is best for Australia. Equally surprising is the fact that Labor, perhaps fearful of history, accepted a deal that left Australia so vulnerable and undermined its independence and sovereignty.
Another nautical metaphor comes to mind: spending money like a drunk sailor. It would be less infuriating if our nation's political leaders didn't spend our money, or if they were motivated by other motives than short-term political gain or fear of getting into trouble.
Perhaps the good news is that it's unlikely that nuclear submarines will arrive anytime soon. The bad news is that in the meantime we'll still have to pay overburdened and underperforming American and British shipyards to support them. With friends like these, who needs to make new enemies?
It is simply hard to believe that a country with an unparalleled geographical advantage and no obvious enemies thinks it is a good idea to spend A$368 billion on an offensive military force that may or may not work, or even be deployed.
Nuked explains how this situation came about, but perhaps we need to ask a psychologist why our political leaders have allowed this kind of stupidity to flourish, turning us into what diplomat Alain Renouf called a “scared nation.”
Mark Beeson is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Technology, Sydney.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
