President Joe Biden's recent approval of a major shift in U.S. nuclear weapons strategy underscores the focus by U.S. national security officials on China's ambitions for global influence.
The U.S. military adjusts its strategic focus, budgets, and plans as the types of threats the U.S. faces change. For example, after 9/11, the U.S. military moved away from its Cold War emphasis on preparing to fight the great Soviet powers and toward fighting smaller terrorist and insurgent groups.
Over the past decade, the Pentagon's efforts have shifted back to preparing for what officials call “great power competition” between the U.S., Russia and China.
The most significant strategic shift evident in planning for great power competition is the emphasis on deterrence. In traditional military strategy, deterrence focuses on making an adversary believe that military force cannot achieve its objectives because the response will be overwhelming and decisive.
The National Defense Strategy, released in October 2022, a document that lays out the nation's goals, objectives, and resource allocations for the next two years, explicitly recognizes the potential risks of tensions or open conflict with Russia and China and calls for “integrated deterrence” to prevent them, meaning a joint effort by military, intelligence, and diplomatic agencies across the U.S. government.
The National Military Strategy (the military component of the comprehensive National Defense Strategy) lays out how the U.S. military contributes to that effort. As a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Chief of Staff of the Department of Defense, I see the military as focused on three primary goals: delivering joint deterrence and preventing conflict with Russia and China;
New Operational Plan
For the military, integrated deterrence means influencing an adversary's decisions about when, where, how, and whether to use military force against the United States or its interests, depending on where forces are located and what they can do once they are in action.
As it shifts focus from counterterrorism to preparing for great-power conflict, the Pentagon has developed new ways to deal with the fact that Russia and China, unlike smaller terrorist groups, can fight in the air, on land and at sea anywhere in the world, and even online and in space.
The first of these is what the Pentagon calls “dynamic force employment,” rapidly deploying U.S. forces around the world without a predictable rotation schedule — an approach that could reassure allies in the face of threats from Russia and China.
For example, the United States has sent as many as 10,000 troops to Poland in the past. Though they are not stationed there permanently, the continued U.S. presence keeps Russia guessing about the size and capabilities of the U.S. military and signals support for anxious NATO allies in eastern Europe.
The second is a shift in personnel and capabilities to what is known as “multi-domain operations,” in which forces with different missions in land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace plan and train together so they are better prepared to work closely together in an actual conflict.
This level of cooperation allows nations to respond to threats in different ways: for example, a challenge to American naval power on the high seas does not have to be met directly with corresponding naval action, but can be met with cyber attacks or attacks from space.
This approach may discourage the PLA from launching a military operation against Taiwan, as not only could China face a violent direct conflict, but U.S. cyber and space operations could disrupt or destroy Chinese military communications, thwarting any attack.
Investing in modernization
Recent studies have estimated that China's investment in its military, particularly its air force, navy and nuclear forces, has increased dramatically over the past two decades to levels roughly equal to those of the United States.
This has forced the U.S. to modernize its military’s corresponding capabilities. In its fiscal year 2024 budget, the Pentagon allocates a massive $234.9 billion to programs supporting joint deterrence, likely a 10% increase over previous spending plans.
Part of the funding will be used to develop and purchase F-35 fighter jets and build Columbia-class nuclear submarines. The deployment of these aircraft and submarines by the United States and its Pacific allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, will remind potential adversaries of America's military power, which in itself serves as a deterrent against foreign aggression.
China's rapid expansion of its nuclear weapons supply has alarmed U.S. policymakers over the past decade. Then-President Barack Obama urged countries to envision a world without nuclear weapons, but he also approved the most expensive and significant upgrade in history to the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
The Biden administration has renewed its financial commitment in 2022 to “field a modern and resilient nuclear triad” of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and long-range nuclear bombers.
Technological advances
In 2019, the Space Force was established as an independent branch of the military, tasked with defending America's space-based assets and upholding international law.
Because satellite communications are critical to military operations and civilian life, including internet connectivity, the Space Force works closely with Cyber Command, the military organization tasked with protecting the nation from cyberattacks, to prevent malicious hackers from disrupting systems vital to the world, such as the Global Positioning System, more commonly known as GPS.
Recent intelligence indicates that China plans to launch destructive cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure, including the power grid, in the event of any conflict. To counter these plans, Cyber Command continues to strengthen its capabilities to defend U.S. systems and companies from cyberattacks, as well as to carry out attacks against the systems of other nations.
The Pentagon is also trying to counter China's rapidly expanding military power with artificial intelligence software in a program called the Replicator Initiative. The effort aims to build thousands of low-cost, AI-controlled autonomous aircraft and boats that could be used in combat to, in the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, “match their army with our army.”
Integration with Allies and Partners
The U.S. military has also worked to strengthen alliances with other countries, especially over the past four years of the Biden administration.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led NATO to expand its membership and the number and capabilities of troops available to the organization. The United States has strengthened its commitment to NATO, increasing its troop deployments to Eastern Europe and supporting its European defense initiatives by committing approximately $3 billion in funding for additional fighter jets, air defense batteries, and ammunition.
In Asia, the vast region around the Indian Ocean and beyond that is often referred to as the “Indo-Pacific” — the United States has strengthened its alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines by conducting numerous military exercises and increasing military assistance. Efforts like the annual Marine Corps air support exercise are aimed at countering China's military and political influence.
The United States has also committed to selling up to five conventionally armed nuclear submarines to the Australian Navy by 2030, strengthening its alliances with Britain and Australia.
The United States has integrated all these efforts into a coordinated approach to avoid open conflict with China and Russia. But the work is not done. The global political and military landscape is constantly changing, and new security challenges constantly emerge.
Eric Rosenbach is a senior lecturer in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy. Grace Jones, a master's student and research assistant in public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Public Policy, contributed to the research of this article.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
