Did the recent meetings of Central Asian leaders feature an implicit attempt to collectively distance the region from Russia?
Since the 6th Central Asian Summit, which took place in the Kazakh capital Astana just over two weeks ago and was attended by the president of the Caucasus country of Azerbaijan, analysts have been busy trying to interpret the words of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other leaders.
A more enthusiastic person would have also taken into account some of the events that occurred in the weeks and days leading up to the summit, most notably an event in Kazakhstan featuring a speech by Mirziyoyev, the 39-year-old daughter of Uzbekistan's President Shavkhat Mirziyoyev and a senior aide to her father. Mirziyoyev praised the role of reform movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Jadid movement in Uzbekistan and the Arash movement in Kazakhstan. Both movements, he said, helped foster a secular national consciousness in their respective countries.
The focus on Central Asia's departure from its Russian colonial and Russian-led Soviet past was also underscored by Tokayev's op-ed in the state-run Kazakhstan newspaper Pravda, in which he suggested the region could benefit from “the creation of a regional security architecture.”
“As a responsible member of the international community, Kazakhstan insists on strict adherence to the principles of international law, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of borders. I can say with confidence that there are many countries that share Kazakhstan's views,” Tokayev wrote.
The Kazakh president, a former diplomat, knows how to be careful with his words. He did not specify what such a regional framework means, but the implication is that this is not the first time that Tokayev has carefully played with fire. The first time was in 2022, when he openly declared that Kazakhstan’s recognition of Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories positioning themselves as “independent” breakaway states would be unfavorable to the Kremlin.
The Central Asian countries no longer consider themselves part of “Russia's backyard.” (Courtesy of University of Texas Library, CIA map, public domain)
It is notable that Tokayev's Kazakhstan still maintains a generally supportive stance toward Russia and calls its northern neighbor a key strategic partner, but Tokayev appears to be placing increasing emphasis on the economic aspects of cooperation with Russia and less on the geopolitical aspects.
Central Asians generally dislike outsiders calling the region “Russia's backyard,” and Tokayev is not the only Central Asian leader to have demonstrated a defiant attitude with his comments toward Russia since Russia chose to go to war in Ukraine. For example, Tajikistan's Emomali Rahmon caused controversy when he directly told President Vladimir Putin at the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Astana in October 2022, “We have always respected the interests of Russia, our main strategic partner. We want to be respected, too.”
E-International Relations recently published an article by Otabek Akhromov, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Minnesota, exploring the nature of Russia's declining influence in Central Asia.
Akhromov said Russia's foreign policy since the invasion has focused on reducing international isolation. To maintain a positive outlook, Russian propagandists have tried to portray Central Asian countries as allies, but these countries often abstain or avoid relevant votes, he added.
Also noteworthy is the fact that migration from Central Asia to Russia is declining rapidly. Since April, the number of job seekers from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in St. Petersburg has fallen by 60% and 40%, respectively. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan's dependence on migrant remittances from Russia has fallen, with an increasing share of funds now coming from Germany, South Korea, Poland and the United States. This shift is further exacerbating Russia's demographic crisis, exacerbated by the Ukrainian war that is straining the economy.
This has placed Russia in a position of dependence on Central Asia, in stark contrast to the far more exploitative position Moscow took before the Ukrainian war.
“Russia's abuse of its dominant position in Central Asia and its subsequent invasion of Ukraine show how the abuse of power in the modern international system can undermine the status of a great power and lead to its decline,” Akhromov said in the article.
“As a result of its monopoly in the region, Russia has maintained a 'the strong do what they can, the weak put up with' mentality towards Central Asian states. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, primarily advances Moscow's geopolitical goals rather than promoting economic integration among its member states,” his article states.
“A fundamental principle of the EEU is to ensure freedom of movement and the free movement of goods by eliminating tariffs and other non-tariff barriers, but the Kremlin violates these principles whenever it deems it necessary,” it added.
“Russia has also used the economic and strategic advantages it inherited from the Soviet Union in the region. One of the Soviet legacies that has had a detrimental effect on the sovereignty of Central Asian countries is the fact that major routes and transportation of energy resources out of the region mainly passed through Russia,” Akhromov added.
“This has given Moscow a strategic advantage to use its Northern Corridor and Central Asia Center pipelines to leverage its transport capabilities to extract political concessions from Central Asian states. Russia has consistently sought to thwart attempts to diversify trade and gas pipelines in the region and potentially undermine the integration process among the five Central Asian republics.”
Akhromov's argument is that Russia's abuse of its “great power” status in the region has led to deep distrust of Russia among Central Asian countries.
This distrust appears to have deepened after Russia invaded neighboring former Soviet republics, a move seen by many in Kazakhstan, for example, as a precursor to Russia eventually realizing its desire to “retake” northern Kazakhstan.
While Central Asian states may never fully break away from the Kremlin, Russia’s current international pariah status has likely emboldened Central Asian leaders to exercise greater negotiating power in their relations with their former colonial powers.
Tokayev's call for a “security architecture” may not translate into an actual Central Asian military alliance, as such a move would be seen as a direct challenge to Moscow's authority. Kazakhstan has modernized its military since the start of its invasion of Ukraine, but the changes so far have been minimal and are far from prepared for a potential war with Russia. However, statements such as those made in Tokayev's op-ed convey a message that may continue to keep Moscow on edge to some extent. The message to the Kremlin is that it may need more than strong measures and a threatening presence to regain the region's loyalty.
While some see Tokayev's comments as mere posturing, most analysts seem to agree that they offer subtle hints about the future geopolitical course of Central Asia.
Luca Ancheschi, a lecturer at the University of Glasgow, commented to RFE/RL on the significance of Tokayev's remarks: “Since the start of the Ukrainian war, Central Asia has had the chance to re-establish itself in a comfortable geopolitical space. They are trying to say that they are not on Russia's side in Ukraine, like Belarus is, but they are not on Ukraine's side either. They have ties to the West, but they are not pro-Western.”
“But as the war continues and debate over secondary sanctions[faced by those accused of aiding Russian sanctions violations]intensifies, governments in the region may find this space shrinking somewhat.”
