Following Russia's recent military advances and fierce bombardment of Ukraine, Russia has renewed its calls for its Western allies to lift a ban on the use of long-range missiles to strike Russian military targets.
But despite the urgency of Russian forces approaching the strategically important city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine, this aspect of the US presidential election is unlikely to change.
There remains a strong possibility that Donald Trump will win in November and immediately withdraw US aid to Ukraine, forcing Kiev to seek an end to the conflict on Russia's terms. This prospect now dominates the political and military calculations in the conflict.
When Zelensky made the decision in early August to strike back at Russia by invading the Kursk region, when a Trump victory seemed all but certain, his reasoning had several elements.
First, seizing Russian territory would give Kiev an advantage if Ukraine were forced to negotiate with Russia, but the attack was also designed to demonstrate that the Ukrainian military was neither defeated nor incapable of going on the offensive.
This was intended both as a morale boost at home and for the benefit of Kiev's allies: public opinion in the United States was beginning to doubt whether Ukraine could win, and the Kursk Offensive was designed to reverse that perception.
Additionally, and what is even more interesting, the Kursk attack was also launched to test the assumption that Russia would not use an attack by Western weapons on its territory as a trigger for an escalation of the conflict – this has always been Putin’s threat, but Kiev decided to call his bluff against the backdrop of the looming US presidential elections.
The logic goes that if Putin believes the new Trump administration can easily hand him victory in Ukraine, why risk escalating the conflict for a few months?
Ukrainian forces continue to seize Russian territory in the Kursk region. Institute for War Studies
But Russia's restraint in anticipation of a possible Trump victory in November is matched by the Biden administration's caution for similar reasons: The overriding priority of the United States and its allies in supporting Ukraine has been the desire to avoid the Ukrainian-Russian conflict escalating into a broader war with NATO.
This has meant that the West has only been able to gradually increase the scale and scope of military equipment and support it provides to Kiev – first with shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS) on the first day of the conflict, then building up to main battle tanks and eventually F-16 attack aircraft – and while that support has been gradual, it has been helpful.
The quiet support and approval of the Kursk offensive by Kiev’s Western allies is perhaps the latest iteration of this approach. Like Zelensky’s logic, it is based on the same need to improve Kiev’s negotiating power in case of a possible Trump victory, and calculations of Russian restraint ahead of the elections.
The risk is too great
But allowing Ukraine to use Western missiles to strike targets deep inside Russia is clearly seen as too risky, at least by Washington, as the election approaches.
While some Republicans and Democrats in Congress support lifting the ban, the administration is aware that this could give ammunition to President Trump.
That would allow Trump to repeat his alarmist rhetoric that his administration is dragging America into World War III, a move that would be self-defeating if it led to a Trump victory.
The presidential election is so important that every consideration is subject to its gravitational pull: A Trump victory would likely lead to a dramatic reversal of U.S. military, intelligence and political support for Kiev.
If Harris wins
But a Harris victory would also change the dynamics of US support, most importantly, it would significantly strengthen the US position by removing the threat that President Trump would destroy US internationalist foreign policy.
Biden is no longer a lame-duck president, but instead will be free to run a transitional administration focused on his own accomplishments in his final two and a half months in office, free from domestic constraints.
In just one expected policy change, the United States may tighten leaky sanctions on Russian hydrocarbon exports that have so far been tolerated because of the need to keep gas prices low ahead of the elections.
A Harris win would force the Kremlin, and therefore China and other countries, to rethink who they are dealing with. Trump has argued that Putin decided to launch an all-out invasion of Ukraine after believing Biden was weak and indecisive following the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Putin will now have to deal with a new president who may be running a very different administration. Harris is not well known for her foreign policy, but her credentials in international relations and alliance building are unquestionable. She serves on the Intelligence and Homeland Security committees and has traveled extensively as vice president.
And her national security adviser, Philip H. Gordon, said he believes that “there are often practical things the United States can and should do to reduce conflict.” The likelihood that a Harris administration will set new policy directions suggests that at the very least, the response to Kiev’s call for help may be different.
David Hastings Dunn is Professor of International Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Birmingham.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
