This is an edited excerpt from a presentation given by Gareth Evans, Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University and former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Australian Academy of Social Sciences conference.
Politics played a key role in the creation of AUKUS in Australia, and both Australian and US politics will play a key role in determining AUKUS' survival.
At least, that is the case when it comes to its core, submarines. The second pillar of the agreement, on technological cooperation in several new areas, is much less clear in scope and less obviously politically fraught.
On the Australian side, partisan political opportunism was a driving factor in the initiation of the submarine deal, bipartisan political support was a condition of U.S. consent, and maintaining bipartisan support in the future appears to be a prerequisite for the deal to continue, at least with regard to highly sensitive elements such as the delivery of three Virginia-class submarines.
The US side agreed to the agreement not because of domestic political considerations but because of a recognition of US strategic advantages, but its full implementation will still require strong bipartisan support in Congress, and more importantly, at the executive level, it is hard to imagine that the agreement can now stand up to Trump.
Only the UK can reasonably consider domestic politics to be irrelevant to the future of AUKUS. The deal is clearly a gift to the Treasury, with little impact on defence and security interests, so it is unlikely to be objectionable to anyone on any side of the political spectrum.
In Australia, domestic politics were a factor from the start: for the Morrison government, the main driver of the AUKUS decision was undoubtedly the ideological passion for the United States among senior Coalition ministers, but it is undeniable that political opportunism was secondary.
Morrison was keenly aware that the deal presented an opportunity to divide Labor's opposition on defence and security – an area in which Labor has long been seen, rightly or wrongly, as electorally weak – and that core aspects of the deal would inevitably spark opposition within Labor added to its political allure.
The Opposition's initial reaction when they were told at the last minute in September 2021 that Prime Minister Morrison would soon announce the deals he had made with the US and UK, subject to Labor's support, was, and remains, uncritical.
The political inevitability was clear: if Labor had shown any ambivalence, 2022 would have been a khaki election, with Albanese portrayed as someone undermining the alliance and America's commitment to the region.
Moreover, the deal is, at least on the surface, defensible in theory; nuclear propulsion offers clear advantages in speed, durability, and (for now, at least) detectability; and concerns about proliferation and waste are reasonably addressed.
But the Morrison government has been heavily criticised for getting it all wrong in breaking with France, and by the time the submarine deal was finally concluded there were still very real questions left unanswered.
Of particular concern is whether the proposed force structure is truly fully aligned with Australia's strategic objectives, and how closer engagement with the US military would impact the realities of our sovereign institutions. But with Labor in power, there will be plenty of time to consider, negotiate and recalibrate.
What I am criticising now is that it is clear that when Labour comes into power in May 2022, there has never been any such serious review of the entire AUKUS agreement. The key questions have never been seriously addressed. There have never been clearly articulated answers from the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister or anyone else. The answers that are actually emerging over time are deeply worrying.
If the Albanese Government is to launch a truly comprehensive and truly objective investigation, I believe it will have no choice but to produce these important findings.
First, there is no certainty that the eight AUKUS boats will be delivered on time – both the US and the UK know they have explicit opt-out rights – and even in the highly unlikely event that the entire highly complex undertaking goes ahead as planned, we would be waiting 40 years for the last boat to arrive, creating a real capability gap problem.
Second, even acknowledging the superior capabilities of the submarines, the ultimate fleet size seems hardly suitable for the purpose, if that purpose is truly the defence of Australia. Given normal operational constraints (i.e. only two vessels can be deployed at any one time), to what extent will it be possible to gather intelligence, protect archipelagic choke points, protect sea lanes or simply provide ‘long-range deterrence’?
Third, the AUKUS submarine program costs a staggering $368 billion, so unless we significantly increase defense spending as a percentage of GDP, it will be very difficult to acquire the other capabilities needed to have any sort of self-reliant capability to deal with the threat of aggression.
These capabilities include, among others, cutting-edge missiles, aircraft and drones that could arguably be even more critical than submarines to our nation’s defense in the event of such a crisis.
Fourth, the price the US is now demanding in return for allowing access to nuclear propulsion technology is extraordinarily high: not only the now unlimited expansion of Tyndall as a US B52 base, and the increasing likelihood of converting Stirling into a major base for the US Indian Ocean Fleet, joining Pine Gap and North West Cape and Tyndall as nuclear strike targets, but also what is now being called “compatibility” rather than interoperability of the submarine fleet.
But there is now an increasingly clear expectation on the U.S. side that “integrated deterrence” means that Australia will have no choice but to join the United States in fighting a future war anywhere in the Indo-Pacific, including in defense of Taiwan.
It is hard to believe that the transfer to Virginia would go ahead without a final agreement. The idea that we would somehow retain a sovereign authority to decide how all these assets are used if serious tensions erupt is a sick joke. I have personally served as Minister for a junior US ally in a high-conflict situation like the first Gulf War in 1991, and my memories are not good.
5. The purchase price we currently pay, despite its exorbitant amount, is in no way sufficient to guarantee the absolute protective insurance that AUKUS proponents think they are purchasing. It is no exaggeration to say again and again that ANZUS does not obligate the United States to defend us, even in the event of an existential attack.
And extended nuclear deterrence is an illusion for us, as well as for other allies and partners who believe they are taking refuge under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The idea that the United States is willing to risk sacrificing Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul, let alone Perth, has been and continues to be nonsense.
We can rely on the US for military support when it deems it in its national interest, but not otherwise. If Australian assets on Australian territory are threatened or attacked, Washington will no doubt exert deterrence and threaten or implement retaliation, but that is as far as we can hope for.
The crux of all this is what the then French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, said very presciently in 2021, reacting to Prime Minister Morrison's decision.
Australians are entirely at the mercy of US policy developments, justifying rising tensions with China and hoping that Australia's partners, choosing security at the expense of sovereignty, will not realise later that they have sacrificed both.
It may not be too late to change course again if the Albanese government wakes up to the political light and starts considering a Plan B. In that case, the most attractive option would be a reinstatement of the contract with France, assuming Paris can trust us again.
This allowed for the delivery of 12 conventionally powered, very capable submarines at a reasonable cost and time frame, with explicit permission to pursue a nuclear option if desired.
This change would take more time, money, and would also introduce some serious new complexities in how to manage the refueling and maintenance needs of LEU (low-enriched uranium) systems, but overall would be much less burdensome than continuing the AUKUS program.
But of course, it must be acknowledged that the likelihood of a fundamental change in policy is now extremely low. The only external event that could completely derail the AUKUS program and force such a change would be for the United States to make it clear that it will not abandon the Virginia-class missiles at all, due to pressures on its own replacement program.
But it's hard to imagine even a Trump administration doing so, given the extraordinary advantages of the deal the U.S. has extracted from Australia — not just financially, but because it essentially allows the U.S. to treat these ships as an extension of its own fleet.
The prospects for political change in Australia are even tougher. On the Coalition side, barring the return of Malcolm Turnbull, the chances are slim. On the Labor side, the situation is not much better.
The prime minister remains preoccupied with avoiding being labelled as weak on security and has never paid much attention to the complexities of foreign and defence policy, and that is unlikely to change anytime soon.
All of this is rather depressing for those of us who have long nurtured the belief that Australia is a fiercely independent nation, more conscious than ever of the need to engage constructively, creatively and sensitively with our neighbours in the Indo-Pacific and with a vibrant multicultural society that is more representative than ever of the world around us.
A country that has finally accepted the reality that in the new century, geography is far more important than the history of the English-speaking world; a country that has put aside the “fear of abandonment” that was at the heart of its defence and diplomacy for much of the last century; a country that has recognised, as Paul Keating still makes so clear, that we need to find security in Asia, not from Asia.
Australia's unwillingness to accept AUKUS is likely to be one of the worst defence and foreign policy decisions our country has ever made, putting our sovereign independence at grave risk and creating more risks than benefits to the very national security we are pledging to protect.
I cannot imagine such a decision being taken under any of the Hawke-Keating governments that I was part of. Times have changed.
Gareth Evans is a former Australian Foreign Minister, former Chairman of the International Crisis Group and Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
