The Central Asian countries, historically without much experience as independent states, find themselves in a difficult geopolitical situation. It is noteworthy that some republics have demonstrated a good capacity for state and people building. At least some of them, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, have shown very good rates of economic growth, demographics and political stability. To be sure, this development belongs to the realm of authoritarian rule, but in the most characteristic way in the region. As we know from Samuel Huntington's political science classic, Political Order in Changing Societies, political order comes first.
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, historically linked to Russia and geographically close to China and South Asia, have maintained balanced exchanges with external players since independence. While in some ways subject to Russian political influence, the Central Asian states have strengthened their economic exchanges with China and are seeking investment from Western countries. At the same time, their exchanges with South Asian countries and with Iran and Afghanistan have been very limited. Although contemporary Central Asia is geographically close to the region, it remains distant from the subcontinent in many ways.
Since 2021, the situation has begun to change. The revival of the Islamic Emirate and the return of the Taliban to power have completely transformed the geopolitical and economic situation in the region. An active process of regionalization has begun. The withdrawal of the United States from the region has led to the activation of regional players who sensed an opportunity to strengthen their own positions. At the same time, faced with a severe financial crisis, sanctions, freezing of government funds, lack of foreign aid and water shortages, the Taliban became concerned about stability. Recognizing a qualitatively different situation and their own responsibilities, the Taliban began to look for new partners and ways to get out of political isolation and economic crisis.
China became the first major power to give partial diplomatic recognition to the Taliban regime. In February 2024, the ambassador of the unrecognized Islamic Emirate received a high-level welcome in Beijing. In general, the Taliban regime is not yet officially recognized by anyone, but this does not stop major powers from making contacts with Afghanistan's new leadership. Russia also hosted a Taliban delegation to discuss regional threats and potential areas of exchange, despite the lack of official recognition. And Russia is walking a cautious path between cooperation with the fundamentalist Taliban regime and containing the radical Islamist movement on its territory.
The Taliban are open to Chinese investments, but the movement's leadership remains wary of Chinese expansionism. In general, the Taliban are suspicious and wary of China. It is clear that the Taliban want to accept Beijing's financial investments, but at the same time, Afghans do not like what they think China wants to exert political pressure on them. After the Taliban's victory, a paradoxically even more difficult situation arose in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Islamabad, the main sponsor, leader and founder of the Pashtun student movement, has always supported the Taliban. American officials, who have been fighting the Taliban for almost a quarter of a century, have repeatedly pointed out that the Pakistani army supports Afghan insurgents. It is worth remembering only that, according to official statements, the leader of Al-Qaeda was killed not far from a military base on Pakistani territory. Moreover, the Pakistani army and its intelligence agency, the ISI, supported other radical Islamist groups, including the Haqqani network. Moreover, after the Taliban's victory, relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan began to deteriorate. Afghans do not trust Pakistan and are trying to reduce their political and economic influence. In late 2023, Pakistan stepped up pressure on the Taliban to eliminate Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, a Pakistan-aligned splinter group that the Afghan Taliban are eager to politically legitimize. Moreover, Iran’s unstable relations with Pakistan make it difficult to coordinate cooperation with Afghanistan.
At the same time, Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan are looking for further opportunities to build constructive relations with the Taliban not only in the security sphere but also in other areas. Therefore, the lack of diplomatic recognition from Uzbekistan does not prevent the increase in the volume of trade between the two countries. Tajikistan's unstable relations with the Taliban are exacerbated by factors such as organized crime, drug smuggling and illegal border crossing attempts.
The Emomali Rahmon government frequently addresses the continuing threat from Taliban militants. In January 2024, Afghanistan's Defense Minister Mohammad Yaqub issued a harsh statement about Taliban forces killing and arresting dozens of Tajiks and Pakistanis as accomplices in smuggling. The Taliban leadership accuses Dushanbe of infiltrating Tajik intelligence in the border areas and challenging the current Afghan government, but there is no factual confirmation of this. At the 2023 Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) meeting, the Taliban rejected the Tajik government's proposal to create a safe zone around Afghanistan. Stabilizing Tajikistan-Afghanistan relations is therefore perhaps the biggest challenge in increasing engagement with Afghanistan through the Central Asian region.
Thus, the geopolitical situation in Central and South Asia is developing very dynamically. Some Central Asian countries are trying to deepen their ties with the Taliban. These contacts will be based on economic cooperation and security issues. The Taliban and Pakistan will never reach an agreement. Relations between the two countries will remain tense and conflictual. The political influence of the Pakistani army over the various clans and factions of the Taliban will decrease.
