Food security in Southeast Asia is linked to food security in Northeast Asia, where the figures for food import dependency of key agricultural commodities are even more alarming: Japan, for example, is dependent on imports for wheat (83%), soybeans (78%), and edible oil (97%).
Increasing domestic agricultural production seems like an obvious solution, but the magnitude of the challenges countries face, including land and water constraints, means that these cannot be solved overnight. Instead, a regional approach is needed.
Some steps have already been taken – notably the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve by China, Japan and South Korea, which provides a joint rice reserve for use in emergencies and natural disasters – but the current situation shows that stronger measures are needed, with the cooperation of major food-producing partners such as Australia.
05:20
Why the world's rice supply is in jeopardy
Why the world's rice supply is in jeopardy
To achieve this, ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand need to jointly form the ASEAN Plus Five Joint Emergency Reserve and Food Sharing Platform. With Australia and New Zealand on board, a food sharing platform with 15 countries and more than 2 billion people will be created, bringing together major food exporting and importing countries.
Food demand in the region will continue to grow due to population growth, a growing middle class and rising incomes. This will put further pressure on current food production and trade. However, it will be difficult for Asian agricultural producers and exporters to meet the growing demand alone. Australia and New Zealand are well placed to help. By joining the proposed ASEAN mechanism, they could become a much-needed “food supplier” in the region, boosting exports and intra-regional trade.
Canberra and Wellington have other advantages. Strengthening economic ties reflect the government's interests in Asia. For Canberra in particular, the security and prosperity of Australia and Southeast Asia are interlinked, as noted in the Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040. But challenges abound. In addition to lingering tensions between China and Australia and in disputed zones such as the South China Sea, other concerns must be kept in mind, including climate shocks that could exacerbate food inflation and damage agricultural production, and competition for natural resources.
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India halts wheat exports as heatwave and Ukraine war threaten food security
India halts wheat exports as heatwave and Ukraine war threaten food security
Broader concerns about the viability and resilience of the Australia-ASEAN partnership, and Australia's bilateral relations with Southeast and Northeast Asian countries, also need to be considered. In recent years, Canberra's food export policies have sometimes drawn the ire of trading partners. In 2011, Australia banned live cattle exports to Indonesia for six months following the release of footage showing animal cruelty in Indonesian abattoirs. The temporary ban and the sudden loss of a key export market had significant economic impacts on Australian stakeholders, including farmers and exporters. Estimates at the time suggested that halting all live cattle exports to Indonesia could cost the industry AUD 320 million.
On the diplomatic front, the ban strained relations between Australia and Indonesia. Indonesian authorities condemned the decision, viewing it as interference in their domestic affairs and economic interests. A live animal export dispute between Australia and Indonesia was subsequently resolved through negotiations and a commitment to improve animal welfare standards.
Australia has learned important lessons from this episode. In particular, the dispute has helped Australian policymakers to better understand the local situation and the importance of consulting and cooperating with Southeast Asian partners. Australian beef on display at a supermarket in Beijing. Australia is a leading meat exporter, and will be the world's fourth-largest beef exporter in 2022 and supply half of the world's sheep meat in 2023. Photo: AFP For the Food Security Group to function, Australia must also consider potential challenges with its Northeast Asian partners. For example, barley trade with China has been marred by major disputes. Most notably in 2020, when China imposed an 80.5% anti-dumping duty on barley imports, effectively blocking exports to the Chinese market. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce claimed that Australian barley was being sold at unfairly low prices, damaging China's barley industry. The tariffs have hit Australia's barley industry hard. Between 2014-15 and 2018-19, Australian barley exports to China averaged around A$1.2 billion per year. However, Australian farmers and exporters have been forced to seek alternative markets such as Saudi Arabia and Vietnam. At the same time, the value of barley exports has fallen from A$407 per tonne in 2019-20 to A$310 per tonne in 2020-21.
To restore trust with Beijing, Canberra could engage in sustained diplomatic dialogue. The establishment of regular high-level meetings between trade representatives could not only help clear up misunderstandings but also provide a platform for resolving disputes related to food imports or exports within the proposed ASEAN Plus Five mechanism.
In an increasingly fragmented geopolitical environment, strengthening regional trade and expanding emergency food reserves can and should help make the region more stable and resilient to cross-border challenges. Food is too important to leave off the regional policy menu.
Genevieve Donnellon May is a Research Fellow at the Oxford Global Society, Asia Pacific analyst for the Redline Podcast, and a 2023 Pacific Forum Young Leader.
