“As democracy retreats, citizens are coming up with new ways to generate democratic backlash, including using the digital space.” | Photo credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto
Recent developments in Bangladesh, earlier events in Sri Lanka and Pakistan, and the outcome of India's recent general elections clearly suggest a quiet democratic backlash in South Asia. While post-colonial democracies have different historical trajectories, we make sense of this backlash by comparing the cases of India and Pakistan.
Comparisons of the post-colonial political systems of India and Pakistan have primarily focused on why India has survived as a democracy while Pakistan has turned to authoritarianism, despite both countries having similar colonial legacies. Many scholars have detailed the reasons for India's contribution to democracy in comparison to Pakistan, ranging from India's mass-based party system versus the organizational weakness of the Muslim League, to the dominance of certain social classes that make up the Congress (middle class) and the Muslim League (landed aristocracy).
View from Dhaka: What do the people of Bangladesh want?
While the value of such work is clear and adds to our understanding of the political trajectories of India and Pakistan, traditional comparisons have undermined attempts to understand Pakistan's democratic space just as they have obscured the analysis of authoritarian tendencies in India's political system despite its democratic qualities.We expand on what this particular line of reasoning implies and argue that India and Pakistan are in the midst of a quiet democratic backlash, with social forces seeking to reclaim democratic space.
Accountability for democratic excess?
India was a classic example of exceptionalism, with a functioning democracy, a history of free and fair elections, and a widely accepted operating philosophy of separation of powers. Apart from the exception of the 1975 Emergency, India maintained an accountable democracy. Constitutional vision and anti-colonial legacy worked well in India's case to maintain the primacy of civilian rule over military rule. Krishna Menon, who served as Minister of Defence in Jawaharlal Nehru's cabinet (1957-62), played a role in weakening the military, whether out of a larger vision of maintaining the primacy of civilian rule or simply because he had a “most spiteful and petty” attitude towards the generals, writes Jairam Ramesh in his recent biography of Krishna Menon. India never faced the threat of military dictatorship.
However, everything changed with the rise of Narendra Modi in 2014. India played catch-up by rapidly moving towards an authoritarian model of governance based on expanding executive powers. This was perhaps the first time that India's democratic movement not only adopted a presidential system but also campaigned for an opposition-free democracy in the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) “Indian National Congress” campaign. The current administration has politicized issues related to security and the military. Indian universities are being turned into havens of religious and military symbols to counter democratic protest politics of students and youth.
In Pakistan
Pakistan, on the other hand, started from a desperate situation as the bureaucracy and the military crushed the political process and led it in the direction of authoritarianism. Despite deep-rooted authoritarianism among the elites, all military dictatorships since 1958 collapsed due to mass protests driven by popular disgust for military rule. In some cases, mass protests led to Pakistan's first general elections, the start of military crackdowns in the east, and the collapse of the state in 1971, the exact opposite of the military's intentions. The intention to control and dominate the political system collapsed again due to the weight of the lawyers' movement and the loss of national legitimacy as General Musharraf's rule alienated both the masses and the political elite. Pakistan has conducted four general elections since 2008 and has made a relatively smooth transition to democracy, typified by the strong opposition to this transition by the military. During this time, a consensus has developed in Pakistani politics among the political elite to continue on the democratic path (as expressed in the Democracy Charter and the 18th Amendment). However, the past two elections (2018 and 2024) have shown a disturbing trend of political elites seeking an agreement with the military to not only crush but, more importantly, destroy and wipe out the political opposition.
But for the political elite and the military itself, which had made a tactical alliance with the military for political survival, the results were the opposite. What Pakistan has witnessed since 2008 has been a deeper and broader defence of democracy among its people and a growing contradiction between the political class and the military over who should rule. While the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government and the military raised the “Page One” mantra, the Pakistan Muslim League (N), or PML-N, held rallies criticising the government and, more importantly, the military's political machinations.
After a successful vote of no confidence against the government, the PTI replaced the PML-N and sought to remove the military from power, resonating strongly with the public. As a result, the PTI emerged as the party with the largest number of votes in parliament in the general elections, even as the entire state apparatus worked against it. The lesson here is that an alliance with the military provides a short-term avenue for political elites to gain power, but only becomes unpopular as a more politically and socially conscious public begins to question the alliance and the military's political machinations.
The Indian general elections have seen a democratic backlash against the BJP's authoritarian politics. In Pakistan, the military's nexus with political parties has been heavily questioned, leading to public protests and doubts about the legitimacy of elections. However, it must be added that in India, the middle classes have longed for dictatorship at certain historical moments, such as the 1975 Emergency. They felt that dictatorship was more efficient in managing India's diversity and the social unrest that came with it. Historically, the Pakistani middle class has also demonstrated conservative political stances, favoring military rule over chaotic democratic politics. However, the younger generation has become increasingly critical of the military's entry into politics.
From a viewpoint
A comparative analysis of the historical experiences of India and Pakistan shows that as democracy retreats, citizens are devising new ways to generate democratic backlash, including using the digital space. In both India and Pakistan, this has been voiced through electoral outcomes, leading to a stable political transition in India. It will be interesting to see how this plays out in Pakistan.
Farhan Hanif Siddiqui is Professor at the Department of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. Ajay Gudavarti is Associate Professor at the Centre for Political Science, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
